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III. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
 Ms. King (hereinafter “King”) accepts the appellant’s nature of the case and course 
of proceedings as correct.  
Statement of Facts 
 While the state’s recitation of the facts is by and large correct, it fails to address all 
of the relevant testimony by Patrol Sergeant Lathrop (hereinafter “Lathrop”). Lathrop 
testified on direct examination that the vehicle crossed three intersections (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) 
and then made a legal turn on 5th street (Tr. p.6, Ls 11-21). However, when cross examined, 
inconsistencies in that testimony arose. On cross, Lathrop testified that he wrote a report 
in this case, that the stop itself is an important part of his report to get accurate, and that 
when he wrote the report he believed he included all relevant information as to why the 
traffic stop was performed. (Tr. p.8, L. 16 - p.9, L. 9). When questioned, Lathrop testified 
that he wrote in his report that the vehicle did not make a turn at 3rd or 4th Avenue, and 
eventually made a turn at 5th Avenue. (Tr. p.9, Ls 10-19). Lathrop never tried to contradict 
his report that only gave 3rd and 4th Avenue as streets that the car passed through with its 
blinker on. It is because of the cross examination testimony that the Magistrate’s findings 
of fact were that King “had her blinker on through at least two intersections and then turned 
on the third intersection.” (Tr. p.20, L. 20 – p.21, L. 19). 
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 IV. ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
 The Standard of Review in the present case was enunciated in State v. Kelley, 
Docket No. 43392, Filed June 16, 2016: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 
1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 
789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).  
Legal Argument 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 
There are three (3) types of contacts between law enforcement and private 
individuals, including (1) consensual encounters which are not a seizure and no 
justification is required; (2)  stop/investigative detention justified by reasonable suspicion; 
and (3)  actual arrests justified by probable cause.  State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 
P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 
1992); and State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Whenever an officer stops an individual and restrains his or her freedom, even 
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 momentarily, that person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and 
therefore, the stop and detention must comply with the constitutional standards of 
reasonableness.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Matter of Clayton, 113 
Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct.App. 
1995).  The stop and detention of a suspect is justifiable under the Fourth Amendment only 
if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the 
suspect has been engaged in, is engaged in, or is about to engage in criminal activity.  
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975); State v. Benefiel, 
131 Idaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998); and State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237, 939 P.2d 556 
(1997).  The stop must be based on more than mere speculation, inarticulate hunches or 
instinct.  See Terry; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct.App. 1998); and 
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App. 1991).  Reasonable 
suspicion requires more than “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that 
“[w]hether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of 
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 
983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.App.2003); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 
101 S.Ct. 690, 694-96 (1981)). 
Ordinary and routine traffic stops are a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and therefore, the stop must be based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the vehicle is being driven in violation of the traffic laws or that the vehicle or an occupant 
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 has been engageding in or is about to engage in criminal activity.  United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 
(1979); and State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (1999).   
It is well established law that an individual has a reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy where there is a subjective expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or seized and society is willing to accept the subjective expectation of 
privacy.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979); Katz v. United States, 
289 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); and State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P.2d 806 
(Ct.App. 1995).  Generally the driver of a vehicle has standing to contest the 
reasonableness of an investigatory stop as well as the continued detention.  State v. 
Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984).   
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. Thus if it is established that the warrantless search or seizure 
infringed on an individual's legitimate privacy interest, the state must show that the search 
or seizure fell within the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.  California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); and State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995).  Evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights 
must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree."  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State v. 
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927).  In summary, the evidence acquired as a result of 
a constitutionally impermissible search or seizure must be excluded unless the causal 
connection between the seizure and the acquisition has been broken.  Wong Sun v. United 
4 
 
 States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); and State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 787 
P.2d 231 (1990).   
1) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion to Believe King Was Driving 
Under the Influence 
 
Lathrop had insufficient facts to constitute reasonable suspicion of DUI. The only 
facts available to the officer at the time he pulled King over were that she was driving late 
at night, that she went through “at least two intersections” with her turn signal on, and that 
she made a legal turn in the direction she was indicating by her turn signal. The test for 
reasonable suspicion “is fact specific and focuses on the totality of the circumstances.” 
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v. Emory, the 
Court of Appeals reviewed the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop an individual who 
was eventually charged with DUI, and created a test to determine if a driving pattern gives 
rise to reasonable suspicion of intoxication.  
In Emory, the officer who initiated the stop on the defendant stated that the factors 
that led to his reasonable suspicion were: “the slowness of Emory’s response to the traffic 
signal; the closeness of Emory’s vehicle to other vehicles parked on the street; and the fact 
that it was 2:40 a.m. on a Sunday morning.” Id. at 663. Similar to the case at hand, the 
Court of Appeals in Emory maintained that those factors did not give authority to stop 
because they did not indicate Emory had violated any law nor was engaged in criminal 
activity. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the officer lacked the objective facts at the 
time he stopped Emory to infer that Emory was engaged in criminal activity. Specifically, 
the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he evidence adduced by the officer could just as easily 
be explained as conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal 
driving behavior.” Id. at 664. The Court stated that while the officer believed that the 
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 delayed response of the driver could be caused by driving under the influence based on his 
training, “such inferences must still be evaluated against the backdrop of everyday driving 
experience.” Id.  The Court of Appeals accepted that being preoccupied or distracted was 
plausible explanation for why Emory paused after the light turned green. Further, the Court 
stated in reference to the early hour that “the fact that the stop occurred in the early morning 
hours does not enhance the suspicious nature of the observation.”  Id. The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the officer’s observations did not give rise to “reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that Emory was driving his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” While 
the Court stated that it became apparent later that Emory was intoxicated, it also stated that 
“the suspicion of the stop must be based upon objective information available to the officer 
when he decided to make the stop.” Id.  
In King’s case, the primary reason the officer pulled her over was due to his belief 
that she was driving under the influence based on the time of night for the stop and her turn 
signal being on through at least two intersections before turning at the third. In State v. 
Emory, the Court of Appeals stated that the stop in that case occurring in the early morning 
hours did not enhance the suspicious nature of the observations. Thus, the time of night 
should not weigh heavily towards there being reasonable suspicion in King’s case. This 
would leave the turn signal staying on through multiple intersections as the primary basis 
for reasonable suspicion. Just as was the case for the Defendant in State v. Emory, King 
did not break any driving laws based on the objective observations of the officer at the 
time, and her driving should be evaluated against the same “backdrop of everyday driving 
experience” as the Court of Appeals looked at in Emory. Id. If the Court was unable to find 
enough for reasonable articulable suspicion in Emory, it should not find sufficient 
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 reasonable suspicion to pull over King.  
The Idaho Supreme Court recently upheld the Emory test to determine if a driving 
pattern may provide reasonable suspicion of intoxication in State v. Neal. 159 Idaho 439, 
443, 362 P.3d 514, 518 (2015) (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525). 
Specifically “whether the driving pattern falls outside ‘the broad range of what can be 
described as normal driving behavior.’” Id.  In that case, Neal drove twice onto the line 
marking the right side of his lane, near midnight. Id. The Supreme Court held that 
“[w]ithout more, the two instances of moving onto the fog line are not sufficient to arouse 
reasonable suspicion of DUI under Idaho precedent” and that “two instances of driving 
onto the fog line do not create a driving pattern that justifies an investigatory stop of the 
vehicle for suspicion of DUI. Id. at 443-444. The officer’s basis for the stop in Emory is 
similar to Lathrop’s basis for the stop of King in the present case. In both instances, the 
officer pulled the vehicle over for a perceived driving pattern that was not otherwise an 
infraction and not directly in violation of any Idaho code section. No other negative driving 
pattern or law violation is given in either case. Lathrop never specifically stated why his 
training and experience made him believe that a person driving through intersections was 
likely driving under the influence. In fact, Lathrop testified under oath to what amounted 
to a hunch, which would mean it was not connected to any specific knowledge he would 
have in 16 years of being an officer. Therefore there is no evidence upon which an objective 
observer could have relied to indicate that her behavior violated the law, or that her driving 
was impaired in any manner. Instead, it can be more readily explained as within the norm 
of everyday driving behavior. 
The District Court did not, as is suggested, apply the incorrect legal standard to this 
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 case. As noted in Neal, the two justifications of a traffic stop are either reasonable suspicion 
that the driver committed an offense (usually a traffic offense) or the officer had reasonable 
suspicion of other criminal activity, like driving under the influence. Neal, 159 Idaho at 
442, 361 P.3d at 517. As stated above, the test for whether a driving pattern provides 
reasonable suspicion for a DUI is whether the driving falls into the broad range of normal 
driving behavior. Id. at 443. In this case, the driving pattern did not provide reasonable 
suspicion of driving under the influence because it was found to be in the pattern of normal 
driving behavior. Thus, under the facts of this case the only legal basis to pull King over 
would have been some other “illegal driving pattern” as referenced by the district court.  
 There is a suggestion that Lathrop’s 16 years of experience gives greater weight to 
his “hunch” that King was driving under the influence. The first issue with this proposition 
is that the officer gave nothing specific about his training or anything he had learned in 16 
years that gave teeth to his hunch that King was under the influence. The observed driving 
pattern nor his years of experience were never specifically tied together, and when asked 
for the basis of his stop, the officer stated “my suspicion was she could have possibly been 
DUI or something because of the fact that she was going through intersections and not 
turning like her turn signal indicated.”  (Tr. p.12, Ls 7-13) (emphasis added). In short, the 
officer’s suspicion of “DUI or something” fits the definition of “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion,” and reasonable suspicion to stop must be greater than that.  
White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). 
 The brief for the state relies on a number of cases, the first that it cites to is the 
decision in State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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 The case at hand is distinguishable from the case at hand. That case also looked at the same 
test from Emory for reasonable suspicion i.e., did the driving fall within the broad range of 
what can be described normal driving behavior. Id. (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 
P.2d at 525). The vehicle in that case touched the lines on the edge of its lane three times, 
and the Court found that that sort of behavior was not in the pattern of normal driving 
behavior and was an objective indication of the driver’s impairment. The behavior of 
drifting, touching a lane line, and then swerving and over-correcting to the other side of 
the lane is classic behavior of intoxicated drivers. There is no real innocent explanation for 
this sort of swerving back and forth. On the other hand, in King’s case, the behavior of 
leaving one’s turn signal on can just as easily be explained as the driver not knowing which 
street to turn onto. Further, this explanation is supported by the fact that the car turned in 
the direction the turn signal indicated. By contrast, drivers swerving and drifting constantly 
back and forth in their lane is accepted to be an indicator the driver is impaired. King’s 
driving was entirely within the realm of normal driving behavior; she was not speeding or 
committing any other traffic offense, and for all intents and purposes, the only suspicious 
thing about her driving to the officer was the turn signal staying on which could just as 
easily mean she was being a careful driver. These cases demonstrate very different driving 
patterns. And it is correct that no traffic offense was specifically committed in Atkinson. 
However, that does not mean that the standard for reasonable suspicion for a driving pattern 
on a DUI is so low that any observable driving pattern that is not “perfect” is reasonable 
suspicion.  
 Another case cited by the state is State v. Flowers, and that case is also 
distinguishable from the present case. 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1998). In 
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 Flowers, the same test of the driving pattern was used as Emory, Atkinson, and Neal. Id. 
Similar to Atkinson, the driver in Flowers was hugging the fog line, and then weaved in its 
own lane before crossing the fog line and then contacting the center line of the road once 
or twice. Additionally, he was driving 10 miles per hour below the speed limit. Again, this 
pattern of driving has much more objective indicators of impaired driving than in King’s 
case. The driver is swerving back and forth, overcorrecting, and driving below the speed 
limit enough that it was noticeable to the officer. Furthermore the driver in Flowers was 
failing to maintain his lane of travel, and the officer could at least point to multiple factors 
that indicated impairment. This sort of driving pattern is far beyond the driving pattern by 
King; the officer in Flowers is seeing a vehicle hugging a lane line, swerving in its lane, 
going below the speed limit, and potentially crossing the center lane line versus King 
driving in a perfectly normal fashion beyond the turn signal being on for a longer than 
necessary period of time. The Atkinson and Flowers cases highlight a stark contrast to the 
driving pattern by King, and in fact both seem to support that King’s behavior fell into the 
pattern of normal driving behavior.  
 The state also cites to Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d 
164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001).  The basis for the stop in Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t is not 
applicable to King’s case and explicitly is irrelevant to the basis for the stop in the present 
case. 136 Idaho at 276, 32 P.3d at 170. In Wilson, the officers knew based on a call that the 
individual driving the car had just left a residence where he had been drinking and was 
impaired. Id. The officer had a tip from an identified individual (rather than an anonymous 
tip that may not have the same indicia of reliability) that the person driving the car that was 
stopped had in fact been drinking prior to driving and was in fact “definitely drunk.” Id.  
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 At the same time, as in King’s case, the officer did not observe any traffic violations 
himself. No such tip existed in King’s case of an identified individual claiming that King 
was in fact driving the car while impaired. While Wilson does stand for the proposition that 
there does not have to be any driving pattern or traffic violation to have reasonable 
suspicion to stop an individual for driving under the influence, the facts are not applicable 
to King’s case. Absent facts that there was a tip about King driving while impaired, the 
basis for the stop in Wilson does not apply to the basis for the stop in King’s case 
whatsoever. 
 Yet another case relied upon by the state is State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 100, 15 
P.3d 334, 335 (Ct. App. 2000). This case is clearly distinguishable from the present case 
because in Larson a woman called the police due to a man who appeared to be drunk 
knocking on her door. Id. at 100, 15 P.3d at 335. After the officer arrived at the scene, the 
reporting party informed dispatch that the suspect had left the scene in a GMC pickup with 
a shell. Id. The officer then viewed a GMC pickup with a shell leaving the apartment 
complex driveway, and through the windshield, the officer saw that the driver matched the 
suspect description. Id. Just as was the case in Wilson, the officer did not pull over the 
vehicle for either a suspicious driving pattern or a traffic violation but instead relied upon 
an independent witness report of an individual that appeared heavily intoxicated and was 
seen driving away in a vehicle. These facts are, again, not applicable to the facts of King’s 
case. While again standing for the proposition that an officer needs no driving pattern at all 
to pull over a vehicle for suspected DUI, there are no facts in King’s case that the officers 
had independent knowledge or facts from a witness that intoxication was suspected in 
King. Thus, just as was the case in Wilson, the facts and basis for reasonable suspicion in 
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 Larson are inapplicable to King’s case. 
 The state references State v. Brumfield, specifically citing to the language that “a 
series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant further 
investigation when viewed together.” (136 Idaho 912, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 
2001)) (internal quotations removed). It is unclear what “series of acts” that King 
committed; the only specific action she is accused of doing that resulted in the officer 
pulling her over was leaving her turn signal on through at least two intersections and then 
making a legal turn at the third intersection. Brumfield suggests that a series of events, 
when taken together, may support reasonable suspicion when one act alone may not. In 
this case, the series of events that occurred did not generate more reasonable suspicion 
when taken together; in fact, the legal turn made by King dissipated the reasonable 
suspicion of the acts when taken together. This suggestion that acts be taken together as a 
whole supports the finding that there was no reasonable suspicion of King driving under 
the influence in this case.  
2) King’s Turn Signal Did Not Violate the Idaho Code Section Governing Turn 
Signals 
 
There is no law in the state of Idaho that explicitly forbids an individual driver from 
having his or her turn signal on for longer than what is required in order to make a legal 
turn. Idaho Code § 49-808 governs signaling, and states, in relevant part: 
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right 
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and 
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving 
an appropriate signal. 
(2)  A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, 
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
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 before turning. 
(3)  No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without 
first giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately 
to the rear when there is opportunity to give such a signal. 
(4)  The signals required on vehicles by section 49-809, Idaho Code, shall 
not be flashed on one (1) side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a 
courtesy or "do pass" signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from 
the rear, nor be flashed on one (1) side only of a parked vehicle except as 
may be necessary for compliance with this section 
 
I.C. § 49-808 (emphasis added). While the statute requires a turn signal to be on for a 
certain period of time prior to turning, it does not forbid nor make any comment as to the 
legality of having a turn signal on for greater than five seconds or 100 feet. There is also 
no mention in the statute or any other statute that undersigned counsel could find that 
having a turn signal on but not performing the signaled turn was illegal in nature or a traffic 
offense in any way.  
 This statute proscribes a minimum, but no maximum. No statute seems to explicitly 
place a maximum on the amount of time a signal can be on. If the only statute that makes 
such behavior illegal is the inattentive driving statute, then a person would have no way of 
knowing how long their signal had to be on to be in violation of the law.  
 The statute also makes clear that giving the appropriate signal is a matter of public 
safety. A person is not to turn without a signal, change lanes without a signal, decrease 
speed without a signal, not have their signal on for less than 5 seconds, and not have their 
signal on for less than 100 feet. If safety is the primary purpose behind the statute, then 
providing adequate warning for the safety of other drivers should trump any other concern. 
King’s behavior of having the turn signal on for longer than was necessary provides greater 
warning to those around her of a potential upcoming turn. 
 King did not violate I.C. § 49-808, and committed no other traffic infraction 
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 through her driving on the night in question.  
3) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion to Believe King Violated I.C. 
49-1401(3), Inattentive Driving 
 
 King’s driving pattern did not meet the minimal standards for reasonable suspicion 
of inattentive driving. The inattentive driving charge under Idaho Code is explicitly a lesser 
included of reckless driving, and both charges are contained in I.C. 49-1401. Reckless 
driving requires both that a person drive “carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution 
and circumspection” and also that they drive “at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or 
be likely to endanger any person or property, or who passes when there is a line in his lane 
indicating a sight distance restriction.” Id. Inattentive driving applies either in cases where 
“conduct of the operator has been inattentive, careless or imprudent in light of the 
circumstances then existing, rather than heedless or wanton, or in those cases where the 
danger to persons or property by the motor vehicle operator’s conduct is slight.”  
 King’s conduct could hardly been deemed to be careless or imprudent. Leaving a 
turn signal on through at least two intersections does not create a danger for individuals. In 
fact, a turn signal being on puts other drivers on notice of a potential turn, as is the purpose 
of the code section governing turn signals. Thus, King’s behavior could be more properly 
construed to be careful and prudent driving, or is at least as likely to be careful driving as 
it is to be careless driving. In this case she went through at least two intersections and then 
made a legal turn at the third intersection. The legal turn bolsters the argument that she was 
being careful, not careless, in her driving, and was simply putting other drivers on notice 
of her turn. As there were no other vehicles on the road mentioned in testimony, it appears 
any potential danger caused by the turn signal is zero as there were no other individuals on 
the road who could be endangered by her driving.  
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  King’s driving did not meet the standard for any known infraction (punishable by 
a fine only) in the State of Idaho, and the state has not contended that it did. Yet the state 
argues that somehow the turn signal being on through at least two intersections somehow 
constitutes a misdemeanor offense, punishable by both jail and fine.  
The State relies upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Deen v. State to argue 
King’s driving was inattentive. 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998). The State’s 
reliance is misplaced. In that case, Deen was stopped after an officer observed her activate 
her right-hand turn signal and then fail to make the indicated right-hand turn at three 
consecutive intersections. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that “the reasonableness of the 
suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the 
stop, id., including the time of the seizure.” Id. (citing State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 
932-33, 829 P.2d 520, 522-23 (1992)). Further, the Court of Appeals has previously ruled 
that “the suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to the 
officer when he decided to make the stop….” Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525 
(Ct.App. 1991). 
In citing Deen, the state contends that driving through multiple intersections 
signaling an intent to turn but not turning is automatically reasonable suspicion. However, 
the test for reasonable articulable suspicion is fact specific and based on the totality of the 
circumstances in each case, and thus the Court must look at the specific facts of each case 
to determine if there was reasonable suspicion.  
In reviewing some of those specific facts for King’s stop, the case is clearly 
distinguishable from Deen in two important ways. First, the number of intersections the 
defendant passed through with her turn signal on in Deen was found to be three, whereas 
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 in the instant case, the trial court found that King had her turn signal on “through at least 
two intersections and then turned on the third intersection.” (Tr. p.20, L. 20 – p.21, L. 19). 
While one intersection difference may seem like a weak distinction, the reality is that the 
legitimacy of traffic stops often turns on minor distinctions. In State v. Neal, the Supreme 
Court found that simply touching the fog line a few times was not sufficient to warrant a 
traffic stop. 159 Idaho 439, 443 (2015). The Court at the same time made the distinction 
that crossing the lane line separating lanes of traffic would be sufficient to warrant a stop. 
Id. at 446-447. Thus, the difference between a valid and invalid stop may only be which 
side of the roadway the vehicle is drifting towards. Similarly, the distinction of potentially 
one less intersection that the vehicle passed through with its turn signal on shows lesser 
support for the proposition that the driver was driving inattentively; the driver has 
necessarily shown less evidence of careless or imprudent driving by having the signal on 
for fewer intersections at the time of the stop. The officer thus has less information 
available to him at the time from which to base his decision to stop the vehicle.  
Second, and just as important, is that King made a legal turn in the direction her 
blinker was signaling. When a legal turn is added to the facts, it changes the reasonable 
suspicion calculus for the prior driving pattern. It shows that the signal was simply early in 
time (not otherwise specifically illegal under any Idaho traffic law as previously stated) 
and was followed by a completed turn. In State v. Anderson, the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized the concept of reasonable suspicion dissipating: 
If probable cause is established at an early stage of the investigation, it may be 
dissipated if the investigating officer later learns additional information that 
decreases the likelihood that the defendant has engaged, or is engaging, in criminal 
activity  
 
154 Idaho 703, 707, 302 P.3d 328, 332 (2012) (quoting United States v. Ortiz Hernandez, 
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 427 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2005)). The decision in United States v. Ortiz Hernandez expands 
on the idea even further: “As a corollary…of the rule that police may rely on the totality of 
the facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts 
tending to dissipate probable cause.” 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005).  The suspicion of 
criminal behavior based on the fact that the turn signal was on without a legal turn being 
made was erased when King completed her signaled turn at the third intersection. Such an 
early turn signal falls into the pattern of ordinary driving behavior, and any reasonable 
suspicion dissipated when the legal turn was made. 
B. Article 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
The Idaho Constitution, Article 1, § 17, Unreasonable Search and Seizure, contains 
almost identical language to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
 
The Court has, at times, extended protections beyond that granted by the United 
States Constitution, including finding that the “pen register” devices being placed on 
telephones constituted a search under Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. State v. 
Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748-51, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164-67 (1988) (declined to extend by 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2000); declined to extend by State v. Mubita, 
145 Idaho 925, 188 P.3d 867 (2008); distinguished by State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d 
306 (2004)).  
1) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion Under the Idaho Constitution 
to Stop King for DUI or Inattentive Driving 
 
In State v. Henderson, the Idaho Supreme Court highlighted that individual liberty 
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 is “[p]erhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho.” 114 Idaho 293, 298, 
756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988) (distinguished by State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90, 996 P.2d 
309 (Ct. App. 1999)). The Court in that case found that roadblocks established to apprehend 
drunk drivers cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny without express legislative 
authority, particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and prior judicial approval. Id. 
at 299. In its reasoning, the Court stated that “[t]he Idaho Constitution can, where 
appropriate, grant more protection than its federal counterpart.” Id. Henderson 
demonstrates that the Idaho Constitution specifically provides a greater protection and that 
protection stems from the requirement of particularized suspicion. There is no 
particularized suspicion in a situation where everyone driving on a street is stopped by a 
DUI roadblock. Lathrop had no particularized suspicion of DUI when he stopped King. He 
was unable to relate her specific behavior to a greater suspicion of her committing a DUI 
(or something).  
For much the same reasons, there was insufficient reasonable suspicion of 
Inattentive Driving under I.C. 49-1401(3) by King. The same greater standard under Article 
1 § 17 for reasonable, articulable suspicion means that Lathrop’s basis for stopping King 
was not sufficient to show why she should be subject to a seizure for violating the 
Inattentive Driving statute. 
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 V. CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the district court 
reversing the decision of the magistrate. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of November, 2016. 
 
    
Jonathan McCabe, Deputy Public Defender 
Attorney for the Jessica King 
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